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Abstract. We model electoral competition between two parties
in a winner take all election. Parties choose strategically ﬁrst their
platforms and then their campain spending under aggregate uncer-
tainty about voters’ preferences. In the unique Nash equilibrium
larger elections are characterized by a higher participation rate.
Moreover, no matter what the voters’ preferences are, parties spend
exactly the same amounts for their campain in equilibrium. Plat-
forms converge to the center (median voter) and spending increases
as the uncertainty over voters’ preferences decreases.
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1. Introduction
Why do so many people turn out to vote? This is a long-standing
question in social science and one that has turned out to be a major
headache for the rational choice approach to political behavior used
by economists and political scientist alike. In Downs’s (1957) original
formulation of the rational voter hypothesis, the act of voting is para-
doxical since voting involves some costs (e.g. time involved in regis-
tering to vote and going to the voting booth). While those costs may
be low, the probability of a single voter aﬀecting the outcome of the
election is so tiny in a large election that even very small costs should
deter from going to vote any individual motivated solely by the desire
to inﬂuence the election result. The game-theoretic analysis of Palfrey
and Rosenthal (1985), built on earlier work by Ledyard (1984), con-
ﬁrms Downs’s intuition: in large electorates, the voter turnout in the
Nash equilibrium is extremely low, provided that voters are somewhat
uncertain about the preferences or voting inclination of others. This is
clearly at odds with the high turnout we observe in elections.
There must be something more than the simple desire to directly
and individually aﬀect the election that brings people to the voting
booth on election day. As Palfrey and Rosenthal state “a model that
addresses mobilization issues directly is needed if we are to make head-
way answering this normative question as well as positive questions
about the nature of eletoral competition.” In fact political parties
spend considerable money and eﬀort to encourage people to go vote
in a variety of ways. In this paper the amount of campaigning and of
campaign spending of political parties and politicians determines with
some randomness how many individuals go to the voting booths for
each party. We add a ﬁrst stage platform choice decision of the parties
to the Shachar and Nalebuﬀ type of model of political participation
and we study how the uncertainty about the preferences or political
inclinations of the electorate aﬀects two important campaign variables:
the platform chosen by the parties and the campaign spending of the
parties. Namely, we analyze how the propensity of the electorate to
vote for one or the other party (or rather the uncertainty over this
propensity) aﬀects the choices of the parties regarding their political
message or agenda and the amounts of their campaign spending. Of
course the parties’ relative ideologies and their spending prior to the
election are going to be crucial determinants of the overall expected
turnout in the election. The important variable in these two-fold stra-
tegic choices of the parties which is embedded in the political inclin-
ation of potential voters is the expected closeness of the election. ToVOTING LEADERS AND VOTING PARTICIPATION 2
be speciﬁc, our model tells us under general conditions that if parties
are free to choose how much to spend (as in the US), then parties will
spend the same amounts. This equal spending result reﬂects the em-
pirical evidence on campaign spending in the US in the past 40 years
as shown in the picture at the end of the paper. Moreover, how much
will both parties spend ? The closer the election is expected to be, the
more the parties will spend to attract voters because bringing to vote
for one party a few more people could be crucial in a close election.
The second part of the paper (ﬁrst stage) deals with the positioning of
the parties in the policy space, i.e., what policies the two parties choose
to campaign on. The closer the election is expected to be, the more
the policies of the two competing parties will tend to be similar to each
other, namely they will tend converge to the center of the policy space
(median voter). In a close election between two parties in fact, parties
tend to be more pragmatic and less ideological: parties may be willing
to soften their stand on some controversial issues to conform more to
the views of majority of the electorate and try to gain more votes that
way, and the more so the closer the election is expected to be because





p common propensity to vote for d, random with CDF F with sup-
port on d,d
d propensity of a member of d to vote for d and platform of party d









r propensity of a member of r to vote for r and platform of party r
note that we will need d,r ≤ d,1 − d
probability a d votes d is p + d
probability a r votes r is 1 − p + r
D number of d voters participating
R number of r voters participating
c cost of getting a voter to the polls
V per capita value of winning the election
N number of votersVOTING LEADERS AND VOTING PARTICIPATION 3
In this model, two parties d and r c h o o s et h ea m o u n to ft h e i rc a m -
paign spending cD and cR in a winner take all election.
There are N voters in the population, that have a common propensity
(probability) p to vote for party d and 1−p for party r. This propensity





[0,1]. Besides this unknown common propensity, it is common know-
ledge that voters have certain biases towards either party. That is, if
party d spends and amount cD h ew i l lb r i n gt ov o t eD(p + d) people
for his party, where d is known but p is not.
3. Formulation a∈ [0,1]
By spending cD party d will not only bring people to vote for him
but will encourage a number
aD(1 − p − d)
of people to vote for the other party. Where to keep this assumption
as general as possible a is a non-negative number less than or equal to
one: if a =0one party spending does not bring votes to the opposing
party.
The probability that party d wins is equal to the probability that
the number of votes for d is greater than the number of votes for r,
that is
D(p + d)+aR(p − r) >R (1 − p + r)+aD(1 − p − d)
where the spending D of the d party generates D(p + d) votes for the
dp a r t y ,aD(1−p−d) for the opposite r party and (1 − a)D(1−p−d)








The value P (D,R) is a fundamental threshold that we use extensively
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3.1. Parties Objectives. The objective functions of the two parties





















g(1 − d) if Lose
where d and r are the respective locations of the party on the policy
unit interval and g is the beneﬁt associated with the location of the




0 (d) < 0
This means that the party d has maximum beneﬁtf r o mw i n n i n gt h e
election if he is located at the extreme left of the interval and decreasing
g r a d u a l l yt oz e r ob e n e ﬁt from winning if he is located at the midpoint
(median voter). If party d loses the election its utility is more negative
t h ef a r t h e rt ot h er i g h to ft h em i d p o i n tt h ew i n n i n gp a r t yrl o c a t e s
himself. The importance of the election also depends of course on its
size N.I nf o r m u l a s
W
d = N (g(d)(Pr(p ≥ P(D,R))) + g(1 − r)(Pr(p<P(D,R)))) − cD
W
r = N (g(r)(Pr(p<P(D,R))) + g(1 − d)(Pr(p>P(D,R)))) − cR
We assume ﬁrst that the platform choices d and r are given and that
parties choose simultaneously how much to spend D and R.W es o l v e
for this second stage in this section. Once we have solved for this second
stage strategic simultaneous spending decision, we will endogenize the
party platform choices in the ﬁrst stage of the model.VOTING LEADERS AND VOTING PARTICIPATION 5
Taking the ﬁrst order condition we obtain the implicit best responses
U
d















































Hence we obtain the following result:
Both candidates spend the same in equilibrium
There is a unique possible interior solution for the party spending
(pending on the second order conditions)





















(g(d)+g(r))(r + d + A)
The fact that the condition −PD = PR implies that the candidates
spend the same: D = R is a direct consequence of the symmetry
property of the threshold value function
PR (D,R)=−PD (R,D)




PD (D,R) 6= PD (R,D) ⇐⇒ D 6= R
we obtain the equal spending result.VOTING LEADERS AND VOTING PARTICIPATION 6
3.1.1. Turnout. The expected turnout rate is generically diﬀerent for
each party, total turnout is not random and is proportional to the
spending
E(Td)=[ ( 1+a)E(p)+d − ar]
D∗
N
E(Tr)=[ ( 1+a)E(1 − p)+r − ad]
D∗
N
T =[ ( 1+a)+( 1− a)(r + d)]
D∗
N
All the properties of the equilibrium spending described in the next
section hold for the total turnout too.

















(g(d)+g(r))(A +( d + r))
The comparative statics is the following:
Party spending is proportional to the importance of the election
measured by the size of the electorate N
If the bias/platform increase from zero and get closer to 1
2 there are
two opposite eﬀects: you want to spend more because you are more
likely to attract people (higher bias), but you also want to spend less
because you care less about winning (see when we describe the ﬁrst
stage platform choice of the model).
Less trivially and most importantly we have the following result:












w h i c hi st h et h r e s h o l df o rw i n n i n gVOTING LEADERS AND VOTING PARTICIPATION 7
p
P(D,R)
D wins R wins
f(P(D,R)) f(p)
This means that parties spend more in equilibrium if this threshold
v a l u ef o rt h ec o m m o np r o p e n s i t yp (or, by continuity, something close
to it) is more likely to be the true value, that is if the election is more
likely to be a close election. If the density is zero around this threshold
value than the parties spend zero in equilibrium. Note that, this value
is not generically linked with the variance of the distribution: in the
uniform case it is though and more certainty (lower variance) implies
more participation.
What we are assuming is that in a larger election the race is more
likely to be close. If this is true then we have higher turnout in larger
elections.
3.3. Second Order Conditions. If the second derivatives of both
objectives at the unique stationary point are negative, then the object-
ives are single-peaked at the stationary point and the interior solution
is the unique Nash equilibrium.
Given that the second derivatives of the threshold are
PDD =2 R




r + d + A
(R + D)
3VOTING LEADERS AND VOTING PARTICIPATION 8
then, the second order conditions become
U
d




























































Both conditions simultaneously imply:
4
(d + r + A)
>







¯ ¯ ¯ ¯ ¯
symmetric case d = r and f symmetric around 1
2 the second order













(1 − 2d)(2d + A)
So, the second order conditions (SOCs) have the property:
The SOCs fail to hold only if the density changes very much
in the threshold point
In this case one of the parties has the incentive to deviate because by
spending a little more than the other party its probability of winning
changes signiﬁcantly.VOTING LEADERS AND VOTING PARTICIPATION 9
p
P(D,R)
D wins R wins
f(p)
f'(P(D,R))
Only in cases similar to the picture above the second order conditions
fail and no interior solution exists. For all other cases the SOCs hold
and there is a unique solution, the interior solution we found.
4. First Stage
We have solved for how much parties would spend given an exo-
genous location in the ideological unit interval. Assume now that the
two parties actually can choose their platforms simultaneously before
deciding how much to spend on the campaign.
Solving backwards taking into account the second stage solution ob-























































































(g(d)+g(r))(A +( d + r))
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g0 (d)(A +( d + r))f +( g(d)+g(r)) ¡
f − 1
2 (A +( d + r))f0¢
¶
In the symmetric equilibrium we have d = r. Hence for a symmetric






























where h represents the likelihood of a close race. The marginal beneﬁt




























By the implicit function theorem we obtain
G(d,h) ≡ 2g(d) − g
0 (d)
µ















A +2 d − 2
h
¢ > 0 ⇐⇒ g
00 (d) < 0
The condition g00 < 0 satisﬁes the second order conditions (see be-
low). Under the latter condition the more likely the probability of a




















is monotonic so for
any given h if an interior solution exists it is unique.VOTING LEADERS AND VOTING PARTICIPATION 11
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,w h e r e a si fA =0then we get interior solutions in the interval:
h ∈ (1,2) d is always non-decreasing in h. In this case the position
of the parties as a function of the closeness are depicted in the picture
below







More certainty increases the spending directly and indirectly be-
cause a higher bias induces higher spending too.
In the case of a convex gain g00 ≥ 0 Ic o n j e c t u r et h a tt h ep l a t f o r m s
c a ne i t h e rb el o c a t e da tt h ee x t r e m e so ri nt h em i d d l e ,t h a ti s
d = r =
½
0 if h ≤ h
1
2 if h>h
This is clear in the linear case, but in the strictly convex case it remains























In the concave case you may want to move from zero because the loss is
n o tv e r yl a r g ea n dy o um a yw a n tt om o v ef r o m1 / 2b e c a u s ey o uw o u l d
have a signiﬁcant gain from doing so. In the convex case you incur a
large loss if you move from zero and you don not gain much if you move
from 1/2. So in the convex case you are stuck at the extremes.
How does certainty impact the ex-post closeness of the election ?
4.0.1. Second Order Conditions. We need to check the second order
conditions to see if the interior solution we found is in fact a maximum,
in which case the second order condition should be negative.
The second derivative of the objective is
g
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g00 (A +2 d)h + g0 (h + A)+
(2g0)h +( 2 g)
¡
1










































T h es a m ec o n d i t i o n sh o l df o rt h ep a r t yra sw e l l .VOTING LEADERS AND VOTING PARTICIPATION 13
Under these conditions the symmetric solution to the ﬁrst order con-
ditions is the unique symmetric equilibrium.
5. Empirical Evidence
Here is some ﬁrst empirical evidence on the amounts of spending by
d e m o c r a t sa n dr e p u b l i c a n si st h es a m ee l e c t i o n ss i n c e1 9 5 6i nt e r m so f
percentages within study year. Parties seem to spend exactly the same
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